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We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors.
We fully characterize the optimal solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of
fundraising costs. The optimal strategy dictates that the fund-raiser target only those
individuals whose equilibrium contributions exceed their solicitation costs. We show
that as the income inequality increases, so does the level of the public good, despite
a non-monotonic fund-raising e⁄ort. This implies that costly fund-raising can provide
a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and government
grants often found in empirical studies. We also show that in large economies, only
the ￿most willing￿ donors are solicited; and the average donation converges to the
solicitation cost of these donors, which is strictly positive.
Keywords: fund-raising, solicitation cost, charitable giving.
JEL Classi￿cation: H00, H30, H50
1 Introduction
Charitable fund-raising1 is a costly endeavor. Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011) indicate that
an average charity spends 5 to 25 percent of its donations on fund-raising activities, including
direct mailing, telemarketing, face-to-face solicitations, and sta¢ ng.2 For instance, every
￿We thank Silvana Krasteva and participants of Duke Theory lunch group for comments. All errors are
ours.
1Charitable sector is a signi￿cant part of the U.S. economy. For instance, in 2008, total donations
amounted to $307 billion. $229 billion of this total came from individuals, corresponding to 1.61% of GDP
(Giving USA, 2009). See Andreoni (2006a) and List (2011) for an overview of this sector and the literature.
2Various watchdog groups such as BBB Wise Giving Alliance and Charity Navigator regularly post these
cost-to-donation percentages for thousands of charities in the U.S. They often recommend a benchmark of
30-35 percent for a well-run charity.
1Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857104
year more than 115,000 nonpro￿t organizations hire fund-raising sta⁄ and consultants,
paying them 2 billion dollars (Kelly, 1998).3 It is thus strongly believed that both donors
and charities dislike fund-raising, but view it to be a ￿necessary evil￿for the greater good:
fund-raising diverts resources away from charitable services while informing, or otherwise
persuading, donors of the cause and fund-drive. Despite its signi￿cance, however, fund-
raising costs have not been fully incorporated into the theory of charitable giving. This is
the gap we aim to ￿ll in this paper, and in doing so, we o⁄er a new (and complementary)
theory of charitable fund-raising.
Our formal setup adds an ￿active￿ fund-raiser to the ￿standard￿ model of giving in
which donors care only about their private consumptions and the total supply of the public
good.4 In particular, unlike the standard model, we assume that each donor becomes
aware of the charitable fund-drive only if solicited by the fund-raiser.5 The solicitation is,
however, costly. Our ￿rst observation is that the charity will contact an individual if he is
expected to give more than his respective solicitation cost, or become a ￿net contributor￿in
equilibrium. We then show that identifying these net contributors in our model is equivalent
to identifying the contributors in the standard model (without fund-raising cost) except that
each donor￿ s wealth is reduced by his solicitation cost. This important equivalence allows us
to appeal to Andreoni and McGuire￿ s (1993) elegant algorithm to solve for the latter. Our
characterization of the optimal fund-raising strategy is simple because it does not require
any equilibrium computation. More importantly, it pinpoints the exact set of donors to be
targeted based on their preferences, incomes, and solicitation costs.6
Using our characterization, we next address two policy-related issues, one about income
redistribution and the other about government grants. When individuals di⁄er only in their
incomes, we show that the fund-raising strategy reduces to assigning each individual a cuto⁄
cost of solicitation that depends on the incomes of others richer than him. Intuitively, with
only the income heterogeneity, the charity considers contacting ￿rst the richest donor; and
3The estimated number of paid workers employed by charities in 2004 was 9.4 million, which is more
than 7% of the U.S. workforce (Sherlock and Gravelle, 2009).
4See, e.g., Warr (1983), Roberts (1984), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), and Andreoni (1988).
5In addition, donors and fundraisers often report that one of the most e⁄ective fundraising techniques
is directly asking people. See Andreoni (2006a) for a discussion; and Yoruk (2009), and Meer and Rosen
(2011) for empirical evidence.
6This is consistent with the fact that fundraising professionals often recommend a careful study
of donor base for an e⁄ective campaign (Kelly 1998). For instance, several software companies such
as DonorPerfect (www.donorperfect.com), DonorSearch (http://donorsearch.net), and Target Analytics
(www.blackbaud.com/targetanalytics) compile donor databases and sell them to charities along with pro-
grams to identify the prospect donors.
2once this donor is in the ￿game￿ , the charity becomes more conservative about contacting
the second richest donor due to the free-riding incentive, which depends on their income
di⁄erence. Iteratively applied, this logic implies that unlike the well-known neutrality result
predicted by the standard theory (e.g., Warr 1983, and Bergstrom et al. 1986), an income
redistribution is likely to a⁄ect the fund-raising strategy and thus the provision of the public
good. In particular, as the income distribution becomes more unequal in the sense of Lorenz
dominance (de￿ned below), we ￿nd that the level of the public good strictly increases in
the presence of costly fund-raising despite a non-monotonic fund-raising e⁄ort. Such non-
neutrality of the public good provision also manifests itself in response to a government
grant to the charity. We show that a more generous grant partially crowds out fund-raising
e⁄ort, leaving some donations unrealized, as well as reducing the amount of the realized
donations. The importance of this additional fund-raising channel for crowding-out has
been recently evidenced by Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011).
Given that many charities have a large donor base, we also investigate optimal fund-
raising in replica economies. We show that in a su¢ ciently large economy, only the donors
who like the public good ￿the most￿ are contacted, whose identity jointly depends on
preference, income, and solicitation cost. Thus, even in a large economy, it is not necessarily
the highest income and/or the lowest solicitation cost donors who will be contacted; rather
it is a combination of all the three attributes that will de￿ne the fund-raiser￿ s strategy.
In particular, while the public good level (net of fund-raising costs) converges to a ￿nite
level, the average donation converges to the respective solicitation cost, which, unlike in the
standard model, is strictly positive.
Aside from the papers mentioned above, our work relates to a relatively small theoretical
literature on strategic fund-raising as a means of: providing prestige to donors (Glazer and
Konrad 1996, Harbaugh 1998, and Romano and Yildirim 2001), signaling the project quality
(Vesterlund 2003, and Andreoni 2006b), and organizing lotteries (Morgan 2000). Our work
is more closely related to the models of strategic fund-raising to overcome zero-contribution
equilibrium under non-convex production either by securing seed money (Andreoni 1998),
or by collecting donations in piece-meals (Marx and Matthews 2000). None of these papers,
however, consider endogenous, costly solicitations.
Our work is most closely related to Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Andreoni and Payne
(2003). Rose-Ackerman is the ￿rst to build a model of costly fund-raising in which donors,
as in ours, are unaware of a charity until they receive a solicitation letter. She, however,
3does not construct donors￿responses from an equilibrium play. Andreoni and Payne (2003)
endogenize both the fund-raiser and donors￿ responses as in our model, but they view
solicitation letters to be randomly distributed. Their main theoretical result is that a
government grant may discourage fund-raising, which is in line with one of our results.
Unlike them, we fully characterize the optimal strategy that involves targeted solicitations,
and provide a richer set of results, regarding the non-neutrality and large economies.
In addition to the theoretical literature, there is a more extensive empirical and exper-
imental literature on charitable giving, to which we will refer below. For recent surveys of
the literature, see the reviews by Andreoni (2006a) and List (2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the model.
In Section 3, we characterize donor equilibrium for an arbitrary set of solicitations. In
Section 4, we determine the optimal fund-raising strategy as a modi￿ed Andreoni and
McGuire algorithm. In Sections 5 and 6, we consider the impacts of income redistribution
and government grants, respectively. We examine large replica economies in Section 7, and
conclude in Section 8. The proofs of all the formal results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Our formal setup extends the standard model of privately provided public goods (e.g., Warr
1983, Roberts 1984, Bergstrom et al. 1986, and Andreoni 1988). Thus, it is useful to brie￿ y
review this basic framework before introducing fund-raising costs.
Standard Model. There is a set of individuals, N = f1;:::;ng, who each allocate his
wealth, wi > 0, between a private good consumption, xi ￿ 0, and a gift to the public good
or charity, gi ￿ 0. Units are normalized so that xi + gi = wi. At the outset, every person
is fully aware of the charitable fund-drive and thus in the ￿contribution game￿ . Letting
G =
P
i2N gi be the supply of the public good, individual i￿ s preference is represented by the
utility function ui(xi;G), which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave,
and twice di⁄erentiable. Both public and private goods are normal. Thus, individual i￿ s
(Marshallian) demand function for the public good, denoted by fi(w), satis￿es the strict
normality: 0 < f0
i(w) < 1 for all w > 0. The equilibrium gifts, fg￿
1;:::;g￿
ng, are determined
through a simultaneous play. Under strict normality, Bergstrom et al. (1986) showed that
there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
To isolate any source of zero provision, we will assume that the standard model produces
4a positive level of the public good in equilibrium, G￿ > 0. One su¢ cient condition for this
is that fi(0) = 0 for all i 2 N, which we will maintain throughout. Together with strict
normality, this condition implies that in a one-person economy, each individual allocates
some positive amount of his wealth to the public good.
Costly Fund-raising. Note that there is no role for fund-raising in the standard
model, as everyone is already aware of the fund-drive.7 Thus, as with Rose-Ackerman
(1982), and Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume that each person i becomes informed of
the fund-drive only if solicited by the fund-raiser.8 It, however, costs ci > 0 to do so,9 which
may re￿ ect such expenses as telemarketing, direct mails, or door-to-door visits. While, for
technical purposes (to break the indi⁄erence), we do not allow for ci = 0, which could
potentially represent repeat donors, one can always take the limits.10
Let F ￿ N be an arbitrary set of donors who are contacted by the fund-raiser, or simply
the fund-raiser set. In our basic model, we assume that each contacted donor is also informed
of the entire set F;11 but we later show that even if the fund-raiser set is unobservable to
donors, they can perfectly infer the ￿optimal￿set in equilibrium. Let g￿
i (F) be donor i￿ s
equilibrium gift in the simultaneous play in F. Then, the total fund-raising cost and the
gross level of donations are de￿ned respectively by,
C(F) =
X




where C(?) = 0 and g￿
i (?) = 0 by convention. Thus, the supply of the public good or
charitable services is given by:
G
￿(F) = maxfG￿(F) ￿ C(F);0g: (1)
The charity￿ s objective is to choose the set F that maximizes G
￿(F). Eq. (1) implies that
if insu¢ cient funds are received to cover the cost, then no public good is provided, which
7Alternatively, since, in the standard model, the equilibrium provision can never decrease by the inclusion
of a new donor despite the free-rider problem (e.g., Andreoni and McGuire 1993), the fund-raiser would
trivially ask everyone for donations.
8Unlike Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume for simplicity that each solicitation reaches the donor
with certainty; or the fund-raiser ensures that this is the case.
9Aside from its informational value, fund-raising may also prevent willing donors from procrastinating
(O￿ Donoghue and Rabin 1999). As Andreoni (2006a, p. 1257) states, an iron law of fund-raising is that
people tend not to give unless thay are asked. See Yoruk (2009), and Meer and Rosen (2011) for some
empirical evidence in favor of this so-called ￿the ask￿principle.
10We could also include a ￿xed setup cost of fund-raising; but its analysis would be similar to that of a
(negative) government grant considered in Section 6.
11For instance, the fund-raiser such as a private university may organize an alumni reunion at which
contacted donors meet each other; or the fund-raiser may strictly instruct its volunteers to solicit donors
from certain neighborhoods.
5simply refers to a failed fund-raising in our model.12 We assume that the charity dislikes
fund-raising in that when indi⁄erent between two fund-raiser sets, it strictly prefers the one
with the lower cost.13
Our fund-raising game proceeds as follows. First, the charity decides whether or not to
launch a fund-drive. If one is launched, then the charity reaches out to a (optimal) set Fo of
potential donors, which then becomes common knowledge among them. Finally, given the
fund-raising cost of C(Fo), the contacted donors simultaneously contribute to the public
good, leading to equilibrium gifts fg￿
i (Fo)gi2Fo and the public good G
￿(Fo). Our solution
concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Next, we brie￿ y explore the donors￿behavior for an arbitrary subset of the population,
and then consider the optimal fund-raiser set.
3 Donor Equilibrium
Suppose that an arbitrary subset F of population has been contacted for donations. Note
that if fund-raising were costless, the contribution game in F would coincide with the stan-
dard model discussed above, and have a unique and positive level of public good in equilib-
rium, G
￿(F) > 0. The fund-raising cost, however, introduces a threshold to the provision
of the public good (see eq.(1)) and the potential for a zero-contribution equilibrium.
To characterize the equilibrium contributions, consider ￿rst person i￿ s solo decision to
cover the entire fund-raising cost, C. Note that person i would receive utility ui(wi;0), if
he contributed nothing. Otherwise, he would have to choose gi ￿ C to maximize ui(wi ￿
gi;gi￿C). Let Vi(wi￿C) be i￿ s indirect utility in the latter case, which is increasing in the
(net) income. For C = 0, clearly Vi(wi) > ui(wi;0) because fi(wi) > 0, whereas for C = wi,
we have Vi(0) ￿ ui(wi;0). Hence, there is a unique cuto⁄ cost, b Ci 2 (0;wi] such that when
alone, person i would consume some public good if and only if C < b Ci.14 To highlight the
collective nature of the fund-raising cost among contributors, we also make
Assumption S. ci < b Ci for all i 2 N.
12For simplicity, it is assumed that donations are not refunded in the case of a failed fundraising, or they
are used for other causes that donors do not care about.
13One justi￿cation for this could be that the charity has some concern about its cost/donation rating by
the watchdog groups. Formally, if F
0 6= F are two fundraiser sets such that G
0 ￿ C
0 = G ￿ C and C
0 > C,
then it follows that C
0=G
0 > C=G.




1=￿i, with ￿i < 1, it is easily veri￿ed that b Ci = [1￿(1=2)
1￿￿i
￿i ]wi
for ￿i 2 (0;1), and b Ci = wi for ￿i ￿ 0 (including the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation at ￿i = 0).
6This assumption is stronger than we need for our results, but it is easier to interpret.15 It
indicates that in a one-person economy, each donor would always prefer to cover his solicita-
tion cost and consume some public good than consume only the private good. Nevertheless,
the following result shows that donors together may contribute nothing.
Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary fund-raiser set, F 6= ?, whose fund-raising cost is C(F).
If C(F) < maxi2F b Ci, then G
￿(F) > 0. If, on the other hand, maxi2F b Ci ￿ C(F),
then there is always zero-contribution equilibrium, generating G
￿(F) = 0.
Proposition 1 simply says that if at least one person can bear the entire fund-raising
cost alone, then the equilibrium provision of the public good is positive. However, if no
person can bear the cost alone, then the zero-contribution pro￿le becomes an equilibrium
despite our Assumption S. This is because absent an explicit cost-sharing agreement, each
donor cares about the total fund-raising cost,
P
i2F ci, at the time of giving ￿not just his
own cost, ci ￿which may well be greater than his threshold b Ci.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that fund-raising expenses may indeed deter donors from
giving and render a fund-drive unsuccessful. Hence, when fund-raising entails signi￿cant
costs, a carefully planned strategy of who to ask for donations seems to be of utmost
importance both to control the expenses and to encourage giving.16 We illustrate this point
with a numerical example, which also motivates our subsequent analysis.
Example 1. Let N = f1;2;3g and ui = x1￿￿
i (G)￿, with ￿ = 0:3. Individuals￿wealth
and solicitation costs are such that (w1;w2;w3) = (18;18;20) and (c1;c2;c3) = (0:01;4;6:9).




3(F) G￿(F) C(F) G
￿(F)
f1g 5:41 ￿ ￿ 5:41 0:01 5:40
f2g ￿ 8:2 ￿ 8:2 4 4:2
f3g ￿ ￿ 10:83 10:83 6:9 3:93
f1;2g 4:83 4:83 ￿ 9:66 4:01 5:65
f1;3g 5:20 ￿ 7:20 12:40 6:91 5:49
f2;3g ￿ 6:84 8:84 15:68 10:9 4:78
f1;2;3g 4:85 4:85 6:85 16:55 10:91 5:64
Table 1: Donor Equilibrium
15In the Appendix, Lemma A3 presents a weaker condition that allows for ci > b Ci.
16Since the fundraising cost introduces a threshold to the public good provision, Proposition 1 is a rem-
iniscent of the equilibrium characterization in Andreoni (1998). Unlike his model, however, the provision
point in ours will be endogenous to fundraising strategy as opposed to being a capital requirement.
7Tables 1 reveals that it is optimal to contact only the donors 1 and 2. Donor 3 is not
included in the set because of his high solicitation cost even though he would give the most.
It also reveals that with the optimal solicitations, the C=G ratio is 41%, which is not the
lowest. Finally, it is clear that even with three donors, a direct approach to identifying the
optimal fund-raiser set promises to be computationally demanding. In the next section, we
make some key observations about the optimal fund-raising strategy and derive a simple
algorithm to ￿nd it.
4 Optimal Fund-raising
Our ￿rst observation is that although donors may end up contributing nothing for an
arbitrary fund-raiser set, the same cannot happen if the set is optimally chosen.
Lemma 1. In a fund-raising equilibrium, Fo 6= ? if and only if G
￿(Fo) > 0.
Lemma 1 says that in a world of complete information, an optimizing charity would
never start fund-raising if it did not expect that donations would exceed the cost. Together
with Proposition 1, this means that in our model, the charity can fail to provide the public
good despite fund-raising only because it suboptimally sets the fund-raising strategy.17
While enlightening, Lemma 1 does not inform us about the composition of individual
contributions. As hinted by Example 1, the optimal fund-raiser set is likely to depend on
this composition. The following result o⁄ers some signi￿cant insights in this direction.
Proposition 2. If Fo 6= ?, then it is unique and exactly identi￿ed by these two conditions:
(C1) every individual i in Fo is a ￿net contributor￿in the sense that g￿
i (Fo)￿ci > 0; and
(C2) any individual i outside Fo would be a ￿net free-rider￿if added to Fo, in the sense
that g￿
i (Fo [ fig) ￿ ci ￿ 0.
Proposition 2 indicates that the charity will contact person i if he is expected to give
more than his own cost in equilibrium. As such, the charity classi￿es donors as net con-
tributors and net free-riders with respect to their solicitation costs even though there is no
explicit cost-sharing agreement among them. The equilibrium gifts exhibit some (implicit)
17As noted in the Introduction, charities spend billions of dollars on professional fundraisers to presumably
have a well-planned fund-drive. For instance, the Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) represent
30,000 such fundraisers.
8cost-sharing due simply to the charity￿ s decision of who to solicit. Note, however, that
net contributors and net free-riders are de￿ned in equilibrium. Thus, if the fund-drive is
expected to be too costly, it is possible that donors give nothing, and in turn no fund-drive
begins, Fo = ?.18
Proposition 2 essentially o⁄ers an algorithm to determine the optimal set. Consider
Table 1 above. We see that Fo 6= f1g because if included in this set, person 2 would also
be a net contributor (4:83 ￿ 4 > 0). Fo 6= f1;2;3g either; because person 3 would be a net
free-rider (6:85 ￿ 6:9 ￿ 0). As a result, Fo = f1;2g.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 is not a full characterization of the optimal strategy because
it involves equilibrium choices. It does, however, point out that the optimal strategy should
exactly identify the set of net contributors, or equivalently the set of net free-riders. A
similar identi￿cation problem would arise in the standard model if one were to detect the
(pure) free-riders. For that case, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) o⁄er an elegant algorithm
that does not require equilibrium calculation for each subset of donors. Although our point
of investigation here is very di⁄erent from theirs, we draw a connection owing to Proposition
2.
When ￿nding the optimal set, it is clear from Proposition 2 that the fund-raiser can
imagine each individual i tentatively paying for ci. Then, the optimal set problem reduces
to ￿identifying the net free-riders￿with residual incomes, wi ￿ ci, by using Andreoni and
McGuire algorithm.19 Let G0
i > 0 be the ￿drop-out￿level of the public good for person i,
which, given that 0 < f0
i < 1 and fi(0) = 0, uniquely solves20
fi(wi ￿ ci + G0
i) = G0
i: (2)
One interpretation of G0
i in our context is that person i becomes a net contributor if and
only if the sum of others￿net contributions stays below G0
i. Without loss of generality,
index individuals in a descending order of their dropout levels: G0
1 ￿ G0
2 ￿ ::: ￿ G0
n. Next,
de￿ne
18This is simply the subgame perfection argument. Some fundraising may never start because, given the
cost, the fundraiser believes the donors would play the zero equilibrium. In fact, given our convention that
g
￿
i (?) = 0, Proposition 2 is also consistent with F
o = ?: C1 would trivially hold while C2 would imply that
everyone would be a net free-rider, resulting in F
o = ?.
19Note that wi ￿ ci > 0 because ci < b Ci by Assumption S. In general, any donor with wi ￿ ci ￿ 0 would
automatically be excluded from the fundraiser set.
20Technically, we need 0 < f
0




(￿j(G) ￿ G) + G;
where ￿j = f￿1
j (inverse demand), ￿0
j > 1, and thus ￿0
i(G) > 0. The following result fully
characterizes the optimal fund-raising strategy.
Proposition 3. De￿ne ￿i ￿ ￿i(G0
i)￿
Pi
j=1(wj￿cj). Then, we have ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n,
with ￿1 > 0. Moreover, letting k 2 N be the largest number such that ￿k > 0,






To understand how the optimal strategy works, note that ￿i can be interpreted as a
measure of person i￿ s incentive to pay for his solicitation cost. In particular, as in Bergstrom
et al. (1986), ￿i(G) is the minimum level of total wealth needed to sustain public good G
as an equilibrium among agents, 1;:::;i. This means that if the actual total wealth available
to these agents is strictly less than ￿i(G0
i), namely ￿i > 0, then the dropout value of
person i, G0
i, cannot be reached, making him a net contributor and thus a candidate for the
fund-raiser set. Given ￿0
i(G) > 0 by the strict normality, these incentives are monotonic in
that ￿i ￿ ￿i+1, and therefore, the fund-raiser considers the largest set of individuals with
a positive incentive. This set will be optimal if, given the total fund-raising cost,
Pk
j=1 cj,
incurred, each individual decides to contribute rather than consume only the private good;
i.e., if, in equilibrium, his net cost,
Pk
j=1 cj ￿ G￿
￿i, is strictly less than his cuto⁄, b Ci. Since
everyone else in the set is expected to give more than his solicitation cost, this net cost
cannot exceed his own cost, which, by Assumption S, is less than his cuto⁄, b Ci.21 As a
point of reference, it is worth observing that if the charity could force each contacted donor
to at least pay for his solicitation cost, then there would be no incentive constraint, ￿k > 0,
because no donor would be able to give less than his cost. This means that providing donors
with the incentives to be net contributors is the reason why some in the population may
not be solicited in our model.
The optimal fund-raising strategy in Proposition 3 is easy to apply given that it does
not require any equilibrium computation. Moreover, it ends in at most n steps, which is
often much smaller than the number of all donor subsets, 2n ￿ 1. Re-consider Example 1
21Lemma A3 in the Appendix o⁄ers a weaker cost condition than Assumption S. It relies on a lower bound
on voluntary provision in a group.
10above. From eq.(2), it is easily veri￿ed that G0
1 = 7:71, G0
2 = 6:0, and G0
3 = 5:61. Using
these, we ￿nd that ￿1 = 7:71, ￿2 = 2:01, and ￿3 = ￿:17, which implies that Fo = f1;2g,
as previously observed.
The optimal fund-raising strategy also has some intuitive comparative statics. Since
eq.(2) implies that all else equal, G0
i is higher (1) the richer the person; (2) the greater his
demand for the public good;22 and/or (3) the lower his solicitation cost, the fund-raiser is
more likely to contact such a person. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that
schools often exclusively solicit alumnus and parents; religious organizations ￿rst target
their members; and health charities primarily ask former patients and their families for
donations.
Proposition 3 also raises an interesting fund-raising question when donors￿preferences
and incomes are negatively correlated. Consider, for instance, two individuals, a and b, with
Cobb-Douglas utilities, and let the solicitation cost be c for each. Then, G0
i = ￿i(wi ￿ c)
where ￿i = ￿i
1￿￿i. Suppose that ￿a > ￿b but wa < wb <
￿a
￿bwa. It can be veri￿ed that there
is some c￿ > 0 such that G0
a > G0
b for c < c￿, and G0
a < G0
b for c > c￿. That is, while for
small costs, the higher preference individual is more likely to be solicited than the richer
one, the order switches for large costs. The reason is that the fund-raising cost has a direct
income e⁄ect, which is larger for the higher preference individual.
4.1 Unobservability of the Fund-raiser Set
While our assumption that the fund-raiser set is observable to donors is reasonable in some
settings, in others, it may be less so. In particular, it may be di¢ cult or infeasible for
donors to monitor the charity￿ s solicitations, in which case they can only hold beliefs about
them. Given the unique optimal set, Fo, one natural belief system is as follows: if a donor
in Fo is contacted, he learns about the fund-drive and believes that the rest of Fo will also
be contacted, whereas, if a donor outside Fo is contacted, he attributes this to a mistake
and believes that he is the only one contacted besides Fo.23 Formally, letting Fi be donor
i￿ s belief about the fund-raiser set when he is contacted, we have Fi = Fo if i 2 Fo,
and Fi = Fo [ fig if i = 2 Fo. Under these beliefs, the following result shows that the
22Formally, person i has a greater demand for the public good than j if fi(w) ￿ fj(w) for all w > 0.
23These beliefs are similar to ￿passive￿ beliefs often used in bilateral contracting in which one party
privately contracts with several others (e.g., Cremer and Riordan 1987; McAfee and Schwartz 1994). One
justi￿cation for such beliefs in our context is that the fundraiser assigns a di⁄erent sta⁄ member to contact
di⁄erent donors so that mistakes are perceived to be uncorrelated.
11unobservability of the fund-raiser set is of no consequence in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the fund-raiser set is unobservable to donors. Then, under
the beliefs, Fi, described above, Fo is sustained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 mainly comes from Proposition 2. When solicitations
are unobservable, the fund-raiser would contact a donor outside the optimal set if he were
expected to be a net contributor. But, this would contradict the fact that he was not
included in the optimal set in the ￿rst place. Proposition 4 says that the fund-raiser does
not necessarily have an incentive to ￿fool￿donors about the solicitations, and run into a
commitment problem about its targeting strategy.
Armed with the optimal fund-raiser behavior, we next address two policy-related issues,
the ￿rst one being the role of an income redistribution.
5 Income Redistribution and Non-neutrality
Suppose that individuals may di⁄er only in their incomes. In particular, they possess
identical preferences and identical costs of solicitation, i.e., ui = u and ci = c for all i. This
means fi = f and ￿i = ￿. Without loss of generality, rank incomes as w1 ￿ w2 ￿ :: ￿ wn.
Since f0 > 0, from (2), this implies that G0
1 ￿ G0
2 ￿ ::: ￿ G0
n. Applying Proposition 3, the
fund-raising strategy then simpli￿es to a cuto⁄ solicitation cost for each donor.
Lemma 2. De￿ne b ￿(G) = ￿(G)￿G, where b ￿(0) = 0 and b ￿
0
(G) > 0. Let the following be
the cuto⁄ solicitation cost for donor i:
ci = maxfwi ￿ b ￿(
i X
j=1
(wj ￿ wi));0g: (3)
Then, we have c1 ￿ c2 ￿ ::: ￿ cn. Moreover, Fo = fi 2 Njc < cig.
That is, based on incomes, the charity determines a cuto⁄ strategy for each individual,
whereby individual i is solicited whenever the actual cost, c, falls below his cuto⁄. In
general, the cuto⁄ is strictly less than one￿ s income except for the richest agent, and the
gap increases for lower income individuals. This is because the fund-raising strategy follows
a pecking order: for a given c, the charity ￿rst asks the richest person(s) for donations,
and once this person is in the ￿game￿ , it becomes more conservative in asking the second
richest person because of the free-rider problem, which is a function of the wealth di⁄erence.
12Applied iteratively, this logic explains why person i￿ s cuto⁄ in (3) is decreasing in the sum
of wealth di⁄erences between him and the others who are richer than him. One important
implication of this observation is that a redistribution of income is likely to a⁄ect the fund-
raising strategy and thus the equilibrium provision of the public good.
As ￿rst observed by Warr (1983), if the set of contributors and their total wealth do not
change by an income redistribution, then neither does the level of the public good in the
standard model of giving.24 This striking theoretical prediction has, however, been at odds
with empirical evidence on private charity.25 As such, several researchers have modi￿ed
the standard model to reconcile this discrepancy; but these modi￿cations have mostly been
con￿ned to the donor side ￿the most prominent one being ￿warm-glow￿giving in which
people also receive a direct bene￿t from contributing.26 Here, we show that strategic and
costly fund-raising can provide a complementary explanation as to the endemic breakdown
of neutrality.
To develop some initial intuition, suppose again that individuals have identical Cobb-
Douglas preferences: ui = x1￿￿
i G
￿, and consider these two income distributions: w0 =
(w;w;:::;w) and w00 = ("+n(w￿");";:::;"), with 1
1+￿=[n(1￿￿)] < "
w < 1. It is readily veri￿ed
that in the standard model, all individuals contribute under both income distributions
and thus in equilibrium, G￿0 = G￿00 > 0. This neutrality result should extend to costly
fund-raising as long as c is small so that everyone is still contacted under both income
distributions. For a su¢ ciently large c, however, the fund-raising strategy, and thus the
public good provision, is likely to be a⁄ected by the income distribution. For instance,
when " < c < w, it is clear that whereas everyone is contacted under the egalitarian
income distribution, w0, only the richest individual is contacted under the unequal income
distribution, w00. This means that although there are more contributors under w0, there
are also more fund-raising expenses. In fact, given Cobb-Douglas utilities, trivial algebra









￿00. Note also that if the fund-raising were even costlier, w ￿ c < " + n(w ￿ "),
then the fund-raising e⁄ort would be reversed: no individual would be contacted under w0,
24Subsequent work showed the robustness of this result with varying generality. See, e.g., Bergstrom et al.
(1986), Bernheim (1986), Roberts (1987), Andreoni (1988), and Sandler and Posnett (1991), among others.
25See, e.g., Clotfelter (1985), Kingma (1989), Steinberg (1991), Brunner (1997), and Ribar and Wilhelm
(2002).
26See, e.g., Cornes and Sandler (1984), Steinberg (1987), and Andreoni (1989).
13whereas the richest person under w00 would still be solicited. Nevertheless, the public good
provision would again imply that 0 = G
￿0 < G
￿00. Of course, if c ￿ " + n(w ￿ "), then no
fund-raising takes place in either case.
Overall, it seems that when fund-raising cost is signi￿cant, the neutrality result is un-
likely to hold. In particular, even if, following an income redistribution, the poorest indi-
viduals remain willing to give, the fund-raiser may no longer solicit donations from them
in order to control the costs. It also seems that while the equilibrium number of solici-
tations responds non-monotonically to a more unequal distribution of income, the public
good provision will always increase. To prove these observations generally, we ￿rst need an
appropriate de￿nition of income inequality. To do so, we employ the well-known concept of
Lorenz dominance (see, e.g., Atkinson 1970, and Lambert 2001).
De￿nition. (Lorenz Dominance) Let w = (w1;w2;:::;wn) be a vector of incomes whose
elements are indexed in a descending order, and de￿ne Li(w) =
Pi
j=1 wj. Consider
two income vectors w0 6= w00 such that Ln(w0) = Ln(w00). It is said that w00 is more
unequal than w0 if w0 Lorenz dominates w00 , i.e., Li(w00) > Li(w0) for all i < n:
Intuitively, an income distribution w00 is more unequal than w0 if the total income is
more concentrated in the hands of the few. In particular, the egalitarian income distribution
Lorenz dominates all the others, whereas a perfectly unequal income distribution in which
one person possesses all the wealth is dominated by all the others. Based on this inequality
concept, we reach,
Proposition 5. Let w0 6= w00 be two income vectors such that w00 is more unequal than w0
in the sense of Lorenz. Moreover, suppose that with the standard model, every person
is a contributor under both w0 and w00 so that G￿0 = G￿00 > 0. Then, G
￿0 = G
￿00 > 0
for c 2 [0;c00
n), and G
￿0 < G
￿00 for c 2 [c00
n;c00
1). For c ￿ c00




Proposition 5 generalizes our intuition from the above discussion. For a su¢ ciently
small cost of fund-raising, every donor is solicited regardless of the income redistribution,
resulting in the same level of the public good. When the cost is signi￿cant, however, the
fund-raising strategy, and the level of public good, is in￿ uenced by the income redistribution.
In particular, a more unequal income distribution produces a higher level of the public good.
14Note from (3) that c00
n is likely to be much smaller than w00
n, whereas c00
1 is equal to w00
1, which
means that the cost interval [c00
n;c00
1) can indeed be signi￿cant.
To illustrate Proposition 5 and the non-monotonicity of the fund-raising strategy, we
present the following example.
Example 2. Let N = f1;2;:::;10g and ui = x1￿￿
i (G)￿, with ￿ = 0:3. Table 2 below
records three income distributions, w0, w00, and w000. It is easy to verify that average income
in each case is 19:27, and Li(w0) > Li(w00) > Li(w000) for all i. Thus, w0 and w000 exhibit the
least and the most inequality, respectively. Using (3), Table 2 reports the cuto⁄ solicitation








1 20:8 21:2 23:5 20:8 21:2 23:5
2 20 19:8 20:97 18:13 16:53 15:07
3 19:8 19:7 18:7 17 15:97 2:2
4 19:7 19:7 18:55 16:2 15:97 1
5 19:5 19:5 18:5 14:13 13:9 0:49
6 18:7 18:65 18:5 4 3:13 0:49
7 18:55 18:58 18:5 1:75 2:08 0:49
8 18:55 18:57 18:5 1:75 1:91 0:49
9 18:55 18:5 18:49 1:75 0:53 0:29
10 18:55 18:5 18:49 1:75 0:53 0:29
Table 2: Solicitation Cost and Non-Monotone Fund-raising
From Table 2, note ￿rst that for a solicitation cost, c ￿ :29, all donors are called




￿000, as it should. Second, for 1:75 < c < 1:91, the fund-raising set is non-monotonic in
income inequality because clearly, F￿0 = f1;2;:::;6g, F￿00 = f1;2;:::;8g, and F￿000 = f1;2;3g,




￿000, as predicted by Proposition 5. For instance, for c = 1:8, we have
G
￿0 = 7:180, G
￿00 = 7:185, and G
￿000 = 7:220.
We should point out that strategic costly fund-raising o⁄ers a complementary expla-
nation for the non-neutrality to those identi￿ed in the literature. In particular, as with
Bergstrom et al. (1986), we draw attention to the endogenous nature of the contribu-
tor set to the income distribution; but unlike in their study of the standard model, the
contributor set in ours is optimally chosen by the fund-raiser. This means, for instance,
that the non-contributors in our model are not necessarily pure free-riders; rather they are
15not asked for donations due to solicitation costs. We should also point out that in their
Theorem 1d, Bergstrom et al. also observe that ￿Equalizing income redistributions that
involve any transfers from contributors to non-contributors will decrease the equilibrium
supply of the public good.￿ 27 However, as is clear from Proposition 5, under strategic costly
fund-raising, the non-neutrality exists even when everyone remains contributors under both
income distributions in the standard model.
6 Government Grants
A long-standing policy question in public economics is that if the government gives a grant
to a charity, to what degree will it displace private giving? While, in light of the neutrality
result, the standard model of giving predicts a complete (dollar-for-dollar) crowding out,
there is overwhelming evidence that this is not the case (see Footnote 25). The empirical
studies have, for the most part, attributed any crowding-out to the donors￿ responses.
Recently however, Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011) have shifted attention and empirically
showed that a signi￿cant part of the crowding-out can be explained by the fund-raiser￿ s
response in the form of reduced fund-raising e⁄orts. By a simple modi￿cation to our base
model, we can theoretically address the same issue here and support their ￿ndings.28
Let R > 0 be the amount of the government grant, and Fo
R and Fo
0 denote the optimal
fund-raiser sets with and without the grant, respectively. The following result summarizes
our ￿ndings in this section.
Proposition 6. Suppose that, without a grant, some public good is provided, i.e., G
￿
0 > 0.
Then, with the grant, donor i is solicited if and only if ￿i > R
(a) there is less fund-raising with the grant, Fo
R ￿ Fo
0;




0) for every i 2 Fo
R;
and
(c) private giving is partially crowded out, i.e., G
￿(Fo








27Bergstrom et al. use direct transfers among donors, but it is well-known that such Daltonian transfers
are equivalent to Lorenz dominance (Atkinson 1970).
28In their 2003 paper, Andreoni and Payne also investigate the issue theoretically and obtain similar
results for government grants. But, as mentioned before, they assume random solicitations.
16Since a government grant directly enters into public good production, part (a) implies
that the charity optimally responds by soliciting fewer donors. This reduced fund-raising
is not because the charity has diminishing returns to funds under a linear production, but
because it anticipates that donors will be less willing to give, as re￿ ected by the optimal
strategy. While, all else equal, cutting back fund-raising increases the public good provision
by cutting costs, it also leaves some donations unrealized. Moreover, despite a smaller
fund-raiser set, and thus less severe free-riding, with the grant, part (b) indicates that
each contacted donor gives strictly less than he would without the grant. This is due to
diminishing marginal utility from the grant that simply overwhelms the small group e⁄ect.
Part (c) shows that the two negative e⁄ects of a government grant, namely lower fund-raising
and fewer donations, never neutralize its direct production e⁄ect on the public good. That
is, the crowding-out is partial because of both the fund-raiser￿ s and the donors￿behavioral
responses.
Two observations are in order. First, unlike income redistribution, a government grant
monotonically reduces the optimal fund-raiser set. The reason is that through the public
good, R uniformly a⁄ects all the donors. Second, Proposition 6 appears consistent with
anecdotal evidence that in economic downturns, fund-raising e⁄orts often increase. For
instance, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, state legislatures across the U.S. cut back
support for higher education, and in response, public colleges and universities are reported
to have stepped up their fund-raising by hiring consultants, hunting down graduates, and
mobilizing student phone banks (New York Times 2011, Jan. 15).
7 Large Replica Economies
Many charities have access to a large donor base. In particular, the advent of information
technology has helped fund-raisers to better search and locate prospect donors. To under-
stand fund-raising behavior in large economies, we consider a simple replica-economy in
which there are r donors of each type represented by the triple (ui;wi;ci), resulting in the
drop-out value G0
i from (2). The following result is the main ￿nding in this section.
Proposition 7. Suppose G0
1 > G0
2 > ::: > G0
n > 0. Then
(a) there are some replicas rn ￿ ::: ￿ r2 < 1 such that type-i donors are not solicited in
any r ￿ ri replica economy.
17(b) As r ! 1, only type-1 donors are solicited, in which case each donation converges to
the solicitation cost, c1, but the public good level approaches G0
1.
Proposition 7 says that except for the most willing type, there is a large enough replica-
tion of the economy in which no other type is solicited. The reason is that as the economy
is replicated, the higher types replace the lower ones in net contributions. Proposition 7
also says that in the limit, each donation from a type-1 person converges to his respective
solicitation cost. While this means that the net contribution is approximately zero, the
level of the public good approaches to a ￿nite level G0
1. Note that even in the limit, it is not
the lowest cost and/or highest income donors who are solicited; rather it is a combination
of all the three attributes that determine the highest type.
Within the standard model, Andreoni (1988) ￿nds that, all else equal, in large economies,
only the richest agents contribute and others free ride. Andreoni also ￿nds that the average
contribution decreases to zero.29 With costly fund-raising, our result suggests that only
the richest agents contribute because they will be the only ones to be solicited in large
economies. Moreover, the average donation converges to the solicitation cost, which is
strictly positive.
8 Conclusion
It is an unfortunate fact that charities need to spend money to raise money. Thus, a careful
planning of who to ask for donations should be paramount for a charity aiming to control its
fund-raising costs while maximizing donations. Perhaps, this is why the charitable sector
has grown to be highly professional and innovative. Yet, the theory of charitable fund-raising
has almost exclusively focused on its revenue side. In this paper, we take a ￿rst stab at ￿lling
this void by introducing an active fund-raiser to the standard model of voluntary giving
as studied by Bergstrom et al. (1986). In particular, we assume that each donor becomes
aware of the fund-drive only if solicited by the charity, which is costly to do. In this extended
model, we fully characterize the optimal fund-raising strategy that can be easily computed
from the donors￿preferences and incomes, and the fund-raiser￿ s solicitation costs. Using this
characterization, we show that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the
non-neutrality of income redistributions and crowding-out hypothesis often encountered in
29See also Fries, Golding, Romano (1991) for a characterization of large economies under the standard
model.
18empirical studies. We also show that in large replica economies, it is only the most willing
types who are solicited for donations ￿not because others would free-ride per se but because
they would not be cost e⁄ective to ask for donations. In addition, the average donation
converges to the solicitation cost, which is strictly positive.
Our analysis is based on the standard model in which donors have purely altruistic
motives of giving. This model allows us to clearly highlight the e⁄ects of fund-raising
costs, and it is the framework most theoretical insights for public good provision are built
on. Before making ￿rm policy recommendations, however, other motives of giving such as
￿warm-glow￿(Andreoni 1989) should also be taken into account. Nonetheless, we believe
that the basic trade-o⁄s identi￿ed in our investigation would continue to emerge in these
enriched settings. For future research, it may also be worthwhile to consider the possibility
of sequential solicitations where donations are collected upon each visit. Another promising,
and perhaps more challenging, direction would be to investigate the competition between
charities where donors￿responses are fully accounted for.
19A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary fund-raiser set, F 6= ?, whose total fund-raising
cost is C(F) > 0. Suppose that C(F) < maxi2F b Ci, but, on the contrary, that G
￿(F) = 0.
Then, it must be that g￿
i (F) = 0 for all i 2 F (otherwise, any g￿
i (F) > 0 would be used
by person i toward the private good). Since C(F) < b Cj for some j 2 F, note that given
G￿
￿j(F) = 0, person j would strictly prefer to contribute, yielding a contradiction. Thus,
G
￿(F) > 0. A similar argument shows that when C(F) ￿ maxi2F b Ci, the zero-contribution
pro￿le is an equilibrium, resulting in G
￿(F) = 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, G
￿(Fo) > 0 implies that some agents have been contacted,
and thus Fo 6= ?. Conversely, suppose that in equilibrium, Fo 6= ?, but G
￿(Fo) = 0. Then,
since C(Fo) > 0, the charity has a strict incentive to choose F = ? and incur no cost. Hence,
G
￿(Fo) > 0. ￿
In what follows, we de￿ne the contributor set, FC = fi 2 Fjg￿
i (F) > 0g.
Lemma A1. If G
￿(F) > 0, then ￿FC(G
￿(F)) =
P
i2FC wi ￿ C(F).
Proof. Suppose G
￿(F) > 0. If i 2 FC, then G
￿(F) = fi(wi + G￿
￿i(F) ￿ C(F)), which,
given that ￿i ￿ f￿1
i , implies that ￿i(G
￿(F)) = wi + G￿
￿i(F) ￿ C(F): Summing over all



















i2FC wi ￿ C(F), as stated. ￿
Lemma A2. Suppose that G
￿(F) > 0. Then, there is a unique value G(F) > 0 that
solves ￿F(G(F)) =
P
i2F wi ￿ C(F). Moreover, G(F) ￿ G
￿(F):
Proof. Since G
￿(F) > 0, we know that G￿(F)￿C(F) > 0, and thus
P
i2F wi￿C(F) >
0. In addition, since ￿F(0) = 0 and ￿0
F(G) > 0, there is a unique G(F) > 0 that solves:
￿F(G(F)) =
P
i2F wi ￿ C(F).
To prove that G




￿(F)), implying that G(F) = G
￿(F). If, on the other hand, F 6= FC, then
we have ￿i (G
￿(F)) ￿ G
￿(F) = wi ￿ g￿
i (F) for i 2 FC, and ￿i (G
￿(F)) ￿ G
￿(F) ￿ wi for
i 2 FnFC. Then, summing over all i 2 F, we obtain,
X
i2F










i2F wi ￿ C(F), it follows that G(F) ￿ G
￿(F). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Fo be the unique optimal fund-raiser set. Suppose that
i 2 Fo but, contrary to C1, g￿
i (Fo) ￿ ci . Note that the equilibrium public good must
satisfy G
￿(Fo) > 0; otherwise we would have Fo = ?, contradicting i 2 Fo. Moreover,
since G
￿(Fo) > 0 and g￿
i (Fo) ￿ ci, there must exist i0 6= i such that g￿
i0(Fo) > ci0 for
some i0 2 Fo. Clearly, Fo
C 6= ? because i0 2 Fo






C wj ￿ C(Fo).
We ￿rst prove that Fo = Fo
C, i.e., everyone in Fo is a contributor. Since Fo
C ￿ Fo
by de￿nition, we only show Fo ￿ Fo
C. Suppose not. Then, j 2 Fo but j = 2 Fo
C for
some j. That is, person j is contacted even though g￿





C wi￿(C(Fo)￿cj) = ￿Fo
C(G(Fo










contradicting the optimality of Fo. Hence, Fo = Fo
C.
Next, recall our initial supposition that i 2 Fo and g￿
i (Fo) ￿ ci . Since we now know
g￿
i (Fo) > 0, it must be that ￿i(G
￿(Fo)) ￿ G
￿ (Fo) = wi ￿ g￿
i (Fo). Inserting this into





































(wj ￿ cj) = ￿Fo
￿i(G(Fo
￿i));
where the last equality follows from Lemma A2. Since ￿0
Fo
￿i > 0, this implies G
￿(Fo) ￿
G(Fo







contradicts the optimality of Fo either because G
￿(Fo) < G
￿(Fo




￿i) and C(Fo) > C(Fo
￿i). As a result, g￿
i (Fo) > ci.
To prove that Fo must also satisfy C2, suppose, by way of contradiction, that individual
i is not in Fo, but that if added to Fo, i￿ s contribution would satisfy g￿
i (Fo [fig)￿ci > 0.
Let Fo [ fig ￿ F+ and F+
C;￿i ￿ F+
C nfig. By de￿nition, F+
C;￿i ￿ Fo. Moreover, since
ci > 0, we have g￿
i (F+) > 0, which implies that ￿i(G
￿(F+)) ￿ G
￿(F+) = wi ￿ g￿
i (F+):











C;￿i wj ￿ C(Fo) + (g￿
i (F+) ￿ ci). If F+
C;￿i = Fo, then, since
g￿





wj ￿ C(Fo) + (g￿
i (F+) ￿ ci) >
X
j2Fo
wj ￿ C(Fo) = ￿Fo(G
￿(Fo)),
where the last equality follows because, by the ￿rst part of the proof, Fo = Fo
C. But, given
that ￿0
Fo > 0, we then have G
￿(F+) > G
￿(Fo), which contradicts the optimality of Fo.
Next, suppose that F+
C;￿i 6= Fo, or equivalently F+





































C;￿i wj ￿ C(Fo) + (g￿
i (F+) ￿ ci) and ￿j(G
￿(F+)) ￿
G
￿(F+) ￿ wj (because j 2 FonF+





wj ￿ C(Fo) + (g￿






j2Fo wj ￿ C(Fo) = ￿Fo(G
￿(Fo)) because Fo = Fo
C. This implies that
￿Fo(G
￿(F+)) > ￿Fo(G
￿(Fo)), which, in turn, implies that G
￿(F+) > G
￿(Fo), contradict-
ing the optimality of Fo. As a result, i is in Fo, which means Fo also satis￿es C2.
((=): We prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium fund-raiser set. Suppose, on the
contrary, that there are two distinct sets F and F0 each satisfying C1 and C2. Note that
F ￿ F0 or F0 ￿ F cannot be the case: otherwise, C1 or C2 would be violated for at least
one set. Next, take any i such that i 2 F0 but i = 2 F. By C2, i would be a net free rider in
F [ fig = F+. Then,
g￿
i (F+) ￿ ci = fi(wi ￿ ci + G￿
￿i(F+) ￿ C(F)) ￿ (G￿
￿i(F+) ￿ C(F)) ￿ 0;
which implies that G0
i ￿ G￿
￿i(F+) ￿ C(F)), where G0
i is given by eq.(2). Therefore,
G0
i = fi(wi ￿ ci + G0
i) ￿ fi(wi ￿ ci + G￿
￿i(F+) ￿ C(F)) ￿ G
￿(F+):
22where the ￿rst inequality follows from the strict normality: 0 < f0
i < 1, and the second
one by de￿nition of equilibrium. Note also that G
￿(F+) ￿ G
￿(F) by the same argument
we made in the ￿rst part above: removing a net free rider weakly increases the equilibrium
public good. Therefore, G0
i ￿ G
￿(F)
In addition, since i is a net contributor in F0 by C1, it follows that
g￿










i = fi(wi ￿ ci + G0










which, in turn, reveals G
￿(F) > G
￿(F0). But, a symmetric argument shows that G
￿(F) <
G
￿(F0), yielding a contradiction. Hence, F = F0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. We ￿rst claim that if G
￿(F) > 0 for some F, then i 2 F
is a net contributor in equilibrium, i.e., g￿





￿ (F) = wi￿g￿
i (F), or equivalently ￿i(G
￿(F))￿G
￿ (F) =
(wi ￿ ci) ￿ (g￿
i (F) ￿ ci) if g￿
i (F) > 0; and ￿i(G
￿(F)) ￿ G
￿ (F) ￿ wi if g￿
i (F) = 0. Since
￿i(G0
i) ￿ G0
i = wi ￿ ci by eq.(2), and ￿0
i > 1, the claim follows.
Now, note that since ￿i+1(G0
i+1) ￿ G0
i+1 = wi+1 ￿ ci+1 by eq.(2), we have













j > 1, it follows that ￿i ￿ ￿i+1. Moreover, ￿1 = G0
1 > 0.




j=1(wj ￿ cj) > 0, there is a unique solution, G








equilibrium among these individuals if
Pk
j=1 cj ￿ G￿

















23Lemma A3. Let k 2 N be the largest number such that ￿k > 0 as in Proposition 3.
Then, if the following condition holds:




(wj ￿ cj)), (A-1)
then
Pk
j=1 cj ￿ G￿






￿. From Lemma A2, we know that G
￿ ￿ G
where G = ￿￿1
k (
Pk
j=1(wj ￿ cj)). Moreover, in any equilibrium person i gives less than his
stand-alone contribution at the cuto⁄ cost: g￿
i ￿ b gi = b Ci + fi(wi ￿ b Ci). This means that if
b gi ￿ G ￿ b Ci is satis￿ed, so is
Pk
j=1 cj ￿ G￿
￿i ￿ b Ci. Inserting and simplifying terms, b gi ￿ G
￿ b Ci turns into the condition (A-1).
Next, we show that fi(wi ￿ b Ci) ￿ ￿￿1
k (
Pk
j=1(wj ￿ b Cj)) is automatically satis￿ed for
i = 1;:::;k. Let b wi ￿ wi ￿ b Ci, which is nonnegative. If b wi = 0 for all i, then the inequality
trivially follows because fi(0) = ￿k(0) = 0. If b wi > 0 for some i, then, by Bergstrom et
al. (1986), there is a unique equilibrium G￿ > 0 and ￿k(G￿) =
Pk
j=1 b wj. But since G￿ ￿
fi(b wi + G￿
￿i) ￿ fi(b wi) for i = 1;:::;k, the inequality again follows. Finally, if Assumption
S is satis￿ed, i.e., ci < b Ci for i 2 N, we have ￿￿1
k (
Pk




which implies (A-1). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. We will show that given the beliefs fFig
n
i=1, contacting j = 2 Fo
is not a pro￿table deviation for the fund-raiser. In particular, letting go
j be j￿ s contribution
in this case, we will show that go
j ￿ cj. To the contrary, suppose go
j > cj. Then, upon being
contacted, person j would expect others￿gross contributions to be G￿(Fo), resulting in
￿j(G
￿(Fo) + go
j ￿ cj) ￿ (G
￿(Fo) + go
j ￿ cj) = wj ￿ go
j. (A-2)
On the other hand, if the individuals in Fo knew about the presence of j before contributing,
then, by Proposition 2, we would have: (1) g￿
j(Fo















+j) ￿ cj and cj < go
j imply that g￿
j(Fo
+j) < go
j, which in turn implies that
wj ￿ g￿
j(Fo
+j) > wj ￿ go
j. Then, since ￿0





j ￿cj. In addition, since G
￿(Fo) ￿ G
￿(Fo
+j) by optimality, we must have go
j ￿ cj,
a contradiction. Hence, go
j ￿ cj. ￿









i)￿1 < 0 since ￿0 > 1. Hence, i 2 Fo if and only if c < ci, where ￿i(ci) = 0.







wj + ic = 0:
Since ￿(G0
i) ￿ G0
i = wi ￿ c from (2), we have G0
i(ci) =
Pi
j=1(wj ￿ wi). In addition, given
that b ￿(G) ￿ ￿(G) ￿ G, we also have b ￿(G0










But, this solution is valid only if it is nonnegative; otherwise the cuto⁄ cost is set to 0 to
mean that person i never contacted for a positive cost, as in eq.(3).





j=1(wj ￿ wi)). Since wi ￿ wi+1 and b ￿
0
> 0, it follows that ci ￿ ci+1, as desired. ￿
Lemma A4. Let ui = u and ci = c for all i 2 N. Moreover, let w0 6= w00be two income
distributions such that w0 Lorenz dominates w00. Then, G
￿0 ￿ G
￿00. In addition, G
￿0 < G
￿00,
if one of the following conditions is satis￿ed: (1) ? 6= F0
C = F00







Cj = m0 and jF00
Cj = m00. First, consider ? 6= F0
C = F00
C 6= N. Since,










i ￿ c) = ￿m0(G
￿00
);
which implies that G
￿0 < G
￿00
. Next, suppose that F00
C ￿ F0







































where the third line follows from the fact that individuals fm00 + 1;:::;m0g are net free-
riders under w00. This implies that Lm0(w0) ￿ Lm0(w00), which contradicts our hypothesis







m0 be the equilibrium level of the public good if they








































￿00. Now, assume, by way of contradiction, that G
￿0 ￿ G






















1 . Note also that c￿00
n > 0 since she is a contributor for c = 0: Hence, for
c 2 [0;c￿00
n ) all individuals are contributors, F00
C = F000
C and Ln(w00) = Ln(w0). Therefore,
26G
￿0 = G
￿00. For c 2 [c￿00
n ;c￿00
1 ), we clearly have that one of the conditions in Lemma A4 is
satis￿ed, and the fact that G
￿0 < G
￿00 follows directly from Lemma A4. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove part (a), note that since G
￿(Fo
R) = maxFfG(F) ￿
C(F) + R;0g, in equilibrium G￿(Fo
R) ￿ C(Fo
R) ￿ 0; otherwise Fo
R = ?, which guarantees
the public good level R. That is, even with an outside grant R, the fund-raiser tries to
maximize G(F) ￿ C(F) in equilibrium. In particular, Proposition 2 still holds. Since
G
￿(Fo
R) > 0, equilibrium condition for individual i 2 Fo
R implies that G
￿(Fo




R)￿R)). This has two implications: First, as in Lemma A1, summing over
all i 2 Fo

































R(wi ￿ ci) + R, or equivalently ￿i > R, where ￿i is stated in Proposition
3.
To prove part (a), suppose G
￿(Fo
0) > 0. Then, Fo
0 6= ?. If Fo




R 6= ?. If i 2 Fo









































(wi ￿ ci) + R,




R). Finally, note that in
equilibrium g￿
i (Fo


















0 < R. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose G0
1 > G0
2 > ::: > G0
n > 0. Note ￿rst that the order
of types is preserved under replicas since G0
i depends only on (ui;wi;ci). In an r￿replica





















i by our indexing, and ￿0
j > 1 by strict normality, it follows that wj ￿ cj >
￿j(G0
i) ￿ G0
i for every j < i. Moreover, since wi ￿ ci = ￿i(G0
i) ￿ G0
i by de￿nition of G0
i,
eq.(A-4) implies that for i > 1, ￿i(r) is strictly decreasing in r, whereas ￿1(r) = G0
1, which
is independent of r.
To prove part (a), observe that since ￿1(r) = G0
1 > 0 for any r, type-1 donors are always
solicited. Consider i > 1. Note that ￿i(1) ￿ 0 implies that ￿i(r) ￿ 0 for any r ￿ 1. If, on
the other hand, ￿i(1) > 0, then there exists ri < 1 such that ￿i(ri) ￿ 0 . This means
￿i(r) < 0 for r ￿ ri. Moreover, given that ￿i(r) > ￿i+1(r), it follows that ri+1 ￿ ri for
i > 1. Thus, type￿i donors are not solicited in a replica economy with r ￿ ri for i > 1.
To prove part (b), note that as r ! 1, only type-1 will be asked for donations by part
(a). Note also that given the symmetry within the limiting group, the equilibrium must be
symmetric. Since G0
1 > 0, it follows that G





imply no contribution, yielding a contradiction. The symmetric equilibrium means that
each type-1 donor is a net contributor, which means that G
￿ is monotonically converging to
G0
1. Since G0
1 is a ￿nite level, we must have g￿
1 ! c1; otherwise, if, in the limit, g￿
1 ￿c1 > 0,
then G
￿ ! 1, making everyone contribute nothing, a contradiction. ￿
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